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According to ontological pluralism, being isn’t univocal—there is more than one kind of 
being or way to exist. And let ontological degreeism be the view that being is gradable—
some entities enjoy more being or a greater degree of existence than others. Being 
fragments just in case either ontological pluralism or degreeism is true. While the idea 
that being fragments has played an import role in the history of philosophy, it’s 
perhaps an understatement to say that it hasn’t held much currency in contemporary 
analytic metaphysics. In his book The Fragmentation of Being, Kris McDaniel argues, 
however, that both ontological pluralism and degreeism are reasonable and fruitful 
views deserving of our consideration.    
The first six chapters of The Fragmentation of Being are devoted to ontological 
pluralism. In the first chapter McDaniel develops a version of this thesis that 
combines elements of views articulated by Heidegger and Theodore Sider. According 
to this Sideggerian view, while the unrestricted quantifier captures a generic notion of 
being, there are special restricted quantifiers that both capture more specific notions 
of being and are more natural (i.e. carve reality closer to the joints) than the 
unrestricted quantifier. (Importantly, these special restricted quantifiers aren’t mere 
restrictions of the unrestricted quantifier, for in this case the latter would be more 
natural then the former.) The view follows Heidegger in taking there to be both 
various specific modes of being in addition to a general, overarching form of being. 
And the view follows Sider in extending David Lewis’ notion of naturalness from 
predicates and their semantic values to other linguistic items such as quantifier 
expressions and their semantic values.  
The second chapter focuses on the broadly Aristotelian idea that there is a 
metaphysical form of analogy. According to McDaniel, analogous properties are 
general properties that, while more natural than disjunctive properties, are less 
natural than their various “specifications” or “analogue instances” (52). (And 
analogousness, like naturalness, is also said to apply to ingredients of reality in 
addition to predicates and properties.) McDaniel sketches what he takes to be 
reasonable ontological views relative to which existence is plausibly regarded as being 
analogous in nature. He discusses views, for example, that distinguish between 
concrete and abstract existence as well as atemporal and temporally relativized 
existence.  
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Chapters three through six are devoted to arguing that ontological pluralism is useful 
to our theorizing about time, ontological categories, “almost nothings,” and persons, 
respectively (140). Each chapter appeals to a special case of the Sideggerian view: 
while the unrestricted quantifier isn’t perfectly natural, there are various perfectly 
natural restricted quantifiers. As for time, McDaniel formulates an A-theory of time 
(a theory according to which the present is in some way metaphysically 
distinguished) according to which existence is analogous. According to McDaniel, 
two specifications of existence are “past existence” and “present existence” (78). 
Among the perfectly natural restricted quantifiers, one ranges over past entities and 
another over present entities.  
Turning to ontological categories, McDaniel articulates a novel version of the view 
that ontological categories are ways of being. The perfectly natural restricted 
quantifiers represent ontological categories, so to belong to an ontological category is 
to fall within the range of one of these special quantifiers.  
With respect to almost nothings such as holes, cracks, and shadows, McDaniel 
claims that they are “beings by courtesy,” where being-by-courtesy is another 
specification of existence understood as an analogous property (146). An entity is a 
being by courtesy just in case it falls within the range of the unrestricted quantifier 
but not any perfectly natural quantifier.  
Turning to persons, McDaniel states that we’re metaphysically distinguished—we’re 
“fully real” in particular—just in case we fall within the range of one of the perfectly 
natural restricted quantifiers (170). For McDaniel, a sufficient condition for being 
fully real in this sense is to instantiate some perfectly natural property. McDaniel 
canvases various proposals according to which we instantiate such properties, 
though he ultimately doesn’t endorse any particular proposal.    
The remaining chapters are devoted to ontological degreeism. In the seventh chapter 
McDaniel clarifies the notion of degrees of existence by considering various accounts 
of its relation to the notion of degreed naturalness. One proposal flows from the 
Sideggerian take on ontological pluralism: for x to exist to degree n is for the most 
natural quantifier that ranges over x to be natural to degree n. Another proposal, one 
that McDaniel prefers, reverses the direction of definition: for x to be natural to 
degree n is for x to exist to degree n.  
The eighth and ninth chapters are devoted to arguing that ontological degreeism is 
useful to our theorizing about grounding and essence, respectively. Supposing that 
grounding is a relation between facts and degreed existence is one measure of 
“ontological superiority” among many, McDaniel proposes that we define grounding 
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roughly as follows: for one fact to ground another is for the former to be 
ontologically superior to the latter (e.g. the former exists to a higher degree than the 
latter), and for these facts to stand in a “connective relation” or a chain of such 
relations (237, 239, respectively). The connective relations are characterized by the 
fact that they induce relations of ontological superiority on their relata—a two-place 
relation R is a connective relation just in case it’s necessary that x bears R to y just in 
case x is ontologically superior to y. The connective relations at issue in the 
definition of grounding are relations between facts in particular—McDaniel suggests 
that modal entailment between facts, fact determination, fact constitution, and disjunction formation 
between facts are candidate connective relations between facts.   
Turning to essence, McDaniel’s discussion is wide-ranging. One of the many 
proposals he considers is this: the particular essence facts (e.g. part of what it is to be 
Ranger is that x is Ranger only if x is a dog) are grounded by general facts about the 
essences of different types of things, and these general essence facts in turn are 
grounded by facts concerning the ontological categories, which are represented by 
the special perfectly natural restricted quantifiers.   
As my selective summary of the book indicates, this is an ingenious work replete 
with interesting and often surprising proposals and distinctions. And, while I didn’t 
stress this above, another virtue of the book is its sustained and fruitful engagement 
with a host of historical figures, some of which (happily) are outside of the western 
tradition. As McDaniel states in the postscript, his project involves taking some “old 
ideas”—that there are modes and degrees of being—and putting them in “new 
clothing,” so as to connect them to the concerns of contemporary analytic 
metaphysicians (290). In my view McDaniel has succeeded in this task.  
I’ll end with some brief critical remarks that focus on ontological degreeism. I worry 
about the proposed theoretical applications of this thesis, particularly the definition 
of grounding. And, as we will see below, McDaniel has his own concerns about the 
proposal, ones that I think he might underestimate. I have three general concerns.  
First, it strikes me that the notion of a connective relation is underdeveloped. 
McDaniel claims that the inventory of connective relations between facts is to be 
established by doing (first-order) metaphysics—if we think, for example, that there 
are determinable and determinate properties, then we should also think that there is a 
connective relation—fact determination—holding between facts concerning the 
instantiation of these properties. Now, metaphysics is hard, so I don’t expect 
McDaniel to propose what is in his estimation an exhaustive list of the connective 
relations between facts. Still, without having at least some idea (however provisional) 
of what such a list might look like, it’s hard to evaluate the plausibility of McDaniel’s 
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proposed definition of grounding, specifically whether there are cases of bare 
grounding (cases in which one fact grounds another yet these facts don’t stand in 
connective relations or chains of such relations).1  
The second concern is related to the first—as McDaniel himself notes, there are 
straightforward grounding claims that, if true, apparently involve bare grounding. 
McDaniel mentions the following case: the fact that x is intrinsically desired by God 
grounds the fact that x is intrinsically good. By way of response, McDaniel suggests 
that you might think that fact constitution is the connective relation in play here. But, 
while I understand what material constitution is, I confess that I don’t have a good 
grip on what fact constitution comes to, if this relation is understood to be distinct 
from grounding itself.  
McDaniel recommends that we “…seriously consider the assumption [that there is 
no bare grounding] but neither decisively accept nor reject it independently of doing 
other first-order metaphysical explorations” (244). My impression is that here 
McDaniel underestimates the problem of bare grounding for his proposal, as there 
are many rationally permissible if not plausible views formulated in terms of 
grounding that seem to commit us to claims that involve bare grounding. Here are 
two examples: given essentialism about modality, the fact that Ranger is essentially a 
dog grounds the fact that it’s necessary that Ranger is a dog; and, given mathematical 
structuralism, the fact that thus-and-so abstract structure has thus-and-so features 
grounds the existence and nature of the number 4. It’s unclear what connective 
relations might be operative in such cases. Now, we could always cook up some 
candidate connective relation to cover these cases, but this would run counter to 
McDaniel’s methodological recommendation to let (first-order) metaphysics decide 
which relations are the connective relations.   
The third issue concerns McDaniel’s characterization of the connective relations in 
terms of ontological superiority. It’s fairly standard to understand the implementing 
mechanisms for causation partly in terms of causation itself. Part of what it is to be a 
causal mechanism is to be a structured entity that induces particular patterns of 
causation. I’m inclined to think that we should say something similar about 
McDaniel’s connective relations, which he claims are relations that implement 
                                                        
1 And it may be that some of McDaniel’s potential connective relations between facts aren’t 
genuine candidates for him given his other commitments. Regarding fact determination, 
McDaniel claims that determinate properties aren’t ontologically superior to their 
determinable properties. This suggests that facts concerning the instantiation of the former 
aren’t ontologically superior to facts concerning the instantiation of the latter either, which in 
turn suggests that fact determination isn’t a connective relation after all (see pg. 240, note 42 
for discussion of this matter).  
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grounding. Don’t say that to be a connective relation is to be a relation that induces 
certain patterns of ontological superiority; say instead that these relations by their nature 
induce particular patterns of grounding.2 
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2 Thanks to Sam Cowling and Kris McDaniel for helpful discussion.  
